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Doubtful Ally or Ally Full of Doubts? 
The Course of Transatlantic Relations under 
Donald Trump’s Presidency
Abstract
Donald Trump’s “America-fi rst” diplomacy has undermined the 
foundations of many alliances, including a transatlantic relationship on 
which post-war liberal order would rest. Under the current American 
presidency, EU–US relations are facing signifi cant challenges whose 
implications are still far from clear. The list of discrepancies between the 
allies are growing ever longer and the American administration’s decisions 
are antithetical to those taken by Brussels and other European capitals. 
Divisions, among other things, have occurred over policies towards the 
Paris Climate Agreement, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the 
Middle East approach. The special relationship between Europe and 
United States can no  longer be taken for granted. In this presented paper, 
the author has looked beyond current political disagreements in order 
to focus on the long term factors underlying the “special relationship”. 
The rationale behind this research is the dawn of great power politics that 
happens during the transition from uni-to-multipolar order. America’s 
disengagement from (and defunding of) the global scene means that the 
European Union will have to adjust to a world with numerous centres of 
power and different sources of threat. Ursula von der Leyen announced, 
upon assuming offi ce in December 2019, that she would lead a “geopolitical 
Commission” engaged in tackling global challenges. All of this in the face 
of the fi rst American administration in post-war history that opposes 
European integration.
Due to the space limit (and deservedness for sole attention), the security 
and defence dimension of transatlantic cooperation will only be briefl y 
mentioned. Regardless of any comments made by former European 
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Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker that the European Union will 
not create an alternative model to NATO1, the creation of a Permanent 
Structure Cooperation (PESCO) and the establishing of a European 
Defence Fund cannot be omitted. Enhanced European defence will be 
essential for a “healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States”2. 
That partnership will, almost certainly, become more transactional.
Keywords: Transatlantic Relations, European Union, United States, Donald 
Trump, Multilateralism 
Not-so-special Relationship
When Harry S. Truman in 1947 asked Congress for assistance for Greece 
and Turkey,3 both endangered by the communism, it was not only a de facto 
declaration of the Cold War, but also a signal that after Second World War 
Washington will not return to isolationism. From that moment the United 
States would provide assistance to any democratic nation under threat 
from authoritarian forces. American president argued that security of the 
US territory depended on it. During Cold War United States built the 
alliance system that would allow them to secure the international balance 
of power. Soviet Union’s containment was focused primarily in Europe. 
The transatlantic alliance has become the bedrock of post-war order 
based on liberal democratic values and principles. Cooperation resulted 
in the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which set 
foundations for World Trade Organization), NATO and eventually the 
European Union.
Unifi cation of Europe has been embedded within a strong transatlantic 
dimension. Partners on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean shared values, 
interests and concerns. EU–US was the most powerful, comprehensive 
and important relationship in the world.4 But that relationship was never 
easy and almost from the beginning of the Cold War oscillated between 
highs and lows. Among lows were Suez crisis in 1956 and fi nal years 
of the Vietnam War. When the Cold War was over American security 
1  European Commission, Towards a European Defence Union, Towards a more unit-
ed, stronger, more democratic Union, May 2019.
2  Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the Euro-
pean Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016.
3  H.S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, Washington D.C., 12.03. 
1947.
4  G. Burghardt, The European Union’s Transatlantic Relationship, “EU Diplomacy 
Papers”, no. 2/2006, p. 3.
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engagement in Europe has decreased. During short “unipolar moment” 
some cleavages between transatlantic partners became uncovered.
In 2001, George W. Bush withdrew the United States from Kyoto 
Protocol which seek to reduce emission of greenhouse gases.5 In a letter 
sent to group of senators, president stated his opposition to Kyoto Protocol 
explaining that act exempted “80 per cent of the world, including major 
population centers such as China and India, from compliance and would 
cause serious harm to U.S. economy”.6 His view was supported by Senate 
which had voted not to ratify the treaty. Two weeks earlier President 
announced that his administration will not try to regulate power plants’ 
emission of carbon dioxide.7 European Union decided to the take lead in 
international climate-change control. In a letter sent to the White House 
and signed by the President of European Commission Romano Prodi 
and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, EU has stressed that global 
strategy to tackle climate change is integral part of the EU–US relations.8 
It have not change Washington’s position.
But the new low in Transatlantic relations were about to happen when 
France and Germany refused to join “coalition of the willing” in the 
Iraq war. Discussions surrounding invasion of Iraq provoked also intra-
European crisis.9 American Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called 
France and Germany “problem” and “old Europe”, contrasting them with 
the “vitality” of Central Easter European countries.10 The rift was especially 
visible from NATO perspective. Eight member states aligned themselves 
with Washington. Lack of support by European powers was in contrast to 
Gulf War I when George H.W. Bush secured help from thirty-four countries, 
many of whom provided substantial military support.11 In the end, George 
W. Bush’s foreign policy has shattered the American moral and political 
authority, even among long-standing allies such as Canada and France.12 
5  In the end, only three countries with targets under the Protocol have not ratifi ed it: 
Australia, Monaco and the United States.
6  G.W. Bush, Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts, 
March 13, 2001. 
7  D. Jehl, A.C. Revkin, Bush, in Reversal, Won’t Seek Cut In Emissions of Carbon 
Dioxide, “The New York Times”, March 14, 2001, Section A, Page 1.
8  Reuters News Service, Bush Reversal Outrages Europeans EU says climate strategy 
“integral” to U.S. relations, 23.03.2001.
9  French President threat to block accession of Central European countries to the 
European Union.
10  M. Baker, U.S.: Rumsfeld’s ‘Old’ And ‘New’ Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide, Ra-
dio Free Europe, 24.01.2003, https://www.rferl.org/a/1102012.html (access 17.04.2020).
11  The list of supporters included also Arab countries.
12  F. Zakaria, The Self-Destruction of American Power, “Foreign Affairs”, no. 98(4), 
July/August 2019, p. 13.
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With the rise of People’s Republic of China the focus on Asia had to 
grow. The “Pivot to Asia” was one of major Barack Obama’s administration 
foreign policy initiatives. According to one member of the administration, 
U.S. was “not pivoting away” from long-time allies, but “rebalancing 
its diplomatic, economic and strategic focus”.13 The centerpiece of that 
shift was Trans-Pacifi c Partnership which could give American economy 
possibility to expand its reach in overseas markets.14 The agreement aimed 
to deepen economic ties, slashing tariffs and fostering trade to boost 
growth between eleven countries in the Pacifi c rim and United States.15 In 
geopolitical dimension, it would have enhance American infl uence and 
could serve as a tool reassuring friends and foes that the United States 
is “multi-dimensional power fully anchored to the region”.16 But fi rst 
and foremost, it would serve as counterweight to China’s dominance in 
the region.17 That rebalance was a clear signal that after a decade long 
presence in Afghanistan and Iraq United States are ending Bush-era focus 
on Middle East and fi ght with terrorism. Barack Obama tried to shape 
new global order, where United States was in the lead but responsibilities 
and burdens were shared whenever possible or necessary.18
Donald Trump’s Presidency. 
Between Ignorance and Blunt Rebuffs
From the beginning of his campaign Donald Trump seemed to ignore 
fact that one of the reasons behind Pax Americana was the alliance system. 
His slogan “America First” sent strong signal that under Donald Trump’s 
lead United States will abdicate global stewardship responsibilities.19 In 
the past relationship with Western Europe and later with European Union 
13  J. Davidson, The U.S. “Pivot to Asia”, “American Journal of Chinese Studies”, 
vol. 21, June 2014, p. 78.
14  According to projections, the trade deal would bring extra annual income gains 
ranging between 57 billion and 131 billion USD by 2032.
15  Except United States, it included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.
16  M. Solis, The Trans-Pacifi c Partnership. The politics of openness and leadership in 
the Asia-Pacifi c, Brookings Institute, Asia Working Group, Paper 6, October 2016, p. 1.
17  B. Obama, The TPP would let America, not China, lead the way on global trade, “The 
New York Times”, 2.05.2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-
the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-
0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html (access 22.04.2020).
18  M.S. Indyk, K.G. Lieberthal, M.E. O’Hanom, Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy, 
“Foreign Affairs”, no. 19(3), pp. 30–31.
19  X. Wickett, Transatlantic Relations Converging or Diverging?, Chatham House 
Report, January 2018, p. 3.
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was a pillar of that stewardship. What surprised many, including European 
leaders, was President Trump’s negative opinion of the EU, which can also 
be perceived as opposition to European integration.20 As a presidential 
candidate Donald Trump hailed the results of the Brexit referendum, 
claiming it was a “great victory”21 and as a president, he encouraged the 
United Kingdom to walk away from negotiation table, if they cannot 
secure a favourable Brexit deal.22 President’s political instincts are clearly 
Jacksonian- based on populist nationalism and only sporadically concerned 
with foreign policy. It is in contrast to Barack Obama’s vision of “renewing 
American leadership” in a “multipolar world”.23 
Apart from policy differences – described below – Trump’s presidency 
has also brought unprecedented sense of ideological drift between partners. 
President’s antagonism toward multilateralism is contrary to European 
approach. Current President of European Commission Ursula von der 
Leyen in her agenda for Europe clearly stated that “multilateralism is 
in Europe’s DNA”,24 which is a clear acknowledgement that multilateral 
system is in vital interest of EU member states.Lack of habit of bargaining 
in the global system can be crucial obstacle in new reality with reemerging 
Russia and domineering China.25 The list of EU’s vulnerabilities is longer 
and includes fragmentation of decision-making process, which is in the 
stark contrast of centralized Russia and China. Internal obstacles include 
cohort of backsliders among which some were courted by Vladimir 
Putin.
Old partners cannot even agree on a vital issue like Middle East 
confl ict. American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 
raised objections among Europeans. During informal breakfast with 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, then High Representative 
20  In May 1950 President Harry Truman offered American support for the Europe-
an Coal and Steel Community which initiated path toward EU-US decades-long coop-
eration. See: H. Truman, Offi cial Statement, 18.05.1950, https://www.cvce.eu/content/
publication/1997/10/13/b1645976-b15d-4d58-9303-d40424987f56/publishable_en.pdf 
(access 22.04.2020).
21  E. MacAskill, Donald Trump arrives in UK and hails Brexit vote as ‘great victory’, 
“The Guardian”, 24.01.2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/24/donald-
trump-hails-eu-referendum-result-as-he-arrives-in-uk (access 23.04.2020).
22  T. Higgins, Trump encourages no-deal Brexit ahead of state visit, offers Britain 
trade deal with US, CNBC, 2.06.2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/02/trump-tells-uk-
to-walk-away-if-eu-doesnt-agree-to-brexit-deal.html (access 23.04.2020).
23  B. Obama, Renewing American Leadership, “Foreign Affairs”, July/August 2007.
24  U. von der Leyen, A Union that strives for more. My agenda for Europe, Political 
Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019–2024.
25  M. Leonard, J. Saphiro, Empowering EU Member States with Strategic Sovereignty, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019, p. 3.
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of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini 
and twenty-eight ministers of foreign affairs clearly stated that European 
Union will not join United States in its recognition and that the solution 
to Middle East confl ict can be only based on two states, with Jerusalem 
as the capital of both, Israel and Palestine.26 American credibility as 
a neutral party in Middle East confl ict was signifi cantly undercut. In 
January 2020, President Trump’s administration unveiled Mideast peace 
proposal.27 Plan could be easily described as “diplomatic malpractice” 
due to its pro-Israeli bias.28 Palestinians were promised a potential 
“state”, but only under particular conditions.29 Josep Borrell’s statement 
forcefully denounced American proposal, accusing US of departing from 
commitment to a negotiated two-State solution.30
In May 2018 President Trump announced that the United States would 
withdraw from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Despite 
the decision, seven of the original eight parties, including European 
Union, adhered to the agreement.31 Following President Trump’s 
announcement, EU emphasized its commitment to the implementation 
of the JCOP and ensured that positive effects of sanctions-lifting should 
continue.32 Relations with Iran become more “complex”when American 
President authorized decision to kill Iran’s top military commander 
Qassem Soleimani. Teheran retaliated by fi ring missiles at bases in Iraq 
used by U.S. soldiers and announcement that it would further reduce its 
compliance with JCOP. United Kingdom, France and Germany replied 
with triggering a formal dispute-resolution. Nations rejected Iran’s 
argument that violation of the deal was justifi ed by United States’ decision. 
On a European Union level High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
26  European External Action Service, Netanyahu realised there is full EU unity on 
Jerusalem, Mogherini says after EU Foreign Affairs Council, 12.12.2017.
27  White House, Peace to Prosperity. A vision to improve the lives of the Palestinian 
and Israeli People, Washington D.C., January 2020.
28  Apart from its content, Plan was released in presence of Israeli Prime Minister Ben-
jamin Netanyahu, Palestinian leaders were absent.
29  Vast majority of Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory would be recognized 
as a part of Israeli State. Palestinians would receive mostly desert territory. Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital would be “undivided”. Palestinian capital could be located to the east and 
north of the city. Jordan valley would be recognized as Israeli territory. 
30  European Union External Action Service, MEPP: Statement by the High Represen-
tative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on the US initiative, Brussels, 4.02.2020.
31  Original Parties of the Agreement (in alphabetical order): China, European Union, 
France, Germany, Iran, Russia, United Kingdom and United States.
32  European Union External Action Service, Declaration by the High Representative 
on behalf of the EU following US President Trump’s announcement on the Iran nuclear 
deal (JCPOA), Brussels, 10.05.2018.
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Affairs and Security Policy is doing everything to prove that EU is able 
to pursue foreign policy independently from United States. During his 
fi rst visit to Iran, in February 2020, Josep Borrell underlined European 
Union’s willingness to deepen its bilateral cooperation.33
In November 2019 United States has begun to formally leave Paris 
climate agreement,34 although decision was announced by President 
two years earlier when he cited “draconian fi nancial and economic 
burdens” the agreement imposes on Washington.35 It means that state 
that has contributed to global warming will not be a part of international 
charge to solve it.36 Donald Trump’s decision is just one of the 
attempts to remove environmental guardrails installed by previous 
administrations37 and is in stark contrast to EU’s actions. Ursula von 
der Leyen’s made “European Green Deal” one of six headline ambitions 
for her Commission, vowing to make Europe “the world’s fi rst climate-
neutral continent”.38 Some EU policymakers used Donald Trump’s 
move to call for steeper emissions cuts.39 Not only that, but Brussels 
joined forces with Canada and China to co-convene annual ministerial 
summits on climate action.40
Managing global pandemia of COVID-19 has also been riddled with 
disagreements. In mid-March 2020 Donald Trump announced travel ban 
from most EU member states. Decision was not consulted with European 
counterparts. At the beginning of May 2020, European Union organized 
pledge to collect 7.5 billion euro for COVID-19 diagnostics, treatments 
and vaccine. Two great absentees? United States and Russia.
33  European Union External Action, Press release following High Representative/
Vice-President Josep Borrell’s offi cial visit to Iran, Brussels, 4.02.2020.
34  M.R. Pompeo, On the U.S. Withdrawal from Paris Agreement (Press Statement), 
4.11.2019.
35  D. Trump, Statement by President on the Paris Climate Accord, Washington, 
1.06.2017.
36  Paris Agreement allowed parties to set their own nationally determined contribu-
tions and lacked enforcement mechanism. Both solutions were introduced to accommo-
date US position and allow President Barack Obama to sign it as an executive agreement 
which does not require Congressional approval.
37  President Trump took number of actions to weaken climate policies, among others: 
to relax restrictions on power plant emission, to stop payments to the Green Climate Fund, 
to appoint lawyer who opposed environmental regulations, as a head of Environmental 
Protection Agency.
38  U. von der Leyen, op. cit.
39  The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament, US formally requests to withdraw 
from Paris Climate Agreement, Press Release, Brussels, 5.11.2019.
40  Third Ministerial on Climate Action (MoCA) took place in June 2019 and was held 
in Brussels.
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The list of disagreements becomes longer and almost every American 
decision in foreign policy astounds not only commentators of public life, 
but also allies. In December 2019, president Trump unilaterally withdraw 
American forces from Syria. U.S. disengagement from Syria created power 
vacuum which allowed Russia to seal its presence in the region. The US 
President has also lifted restrictions on the use of anti-personnel landmine by 
American forces which were introduced by Barack Obama’s administration. 
EU condemned that decision saying that their use, regardless of place, 
time and entity using it, is unacceptable to the European Union.41
Can Trade Save This Relationship?
Despite of the tensions, European and American combined economies 
account for one third of world trade and nearly 50% of global gross domestic 
product. The US is EU’s main export destination, absorbing nearly one fi fth 
of total European Union goods exports. United States are second, lagging 
behind China, among EU’s import partners. Trade relations for a long 
time were heralded as the cornerstone of the transatlantic relationship. 
Nonetheless, it did not prevent President Trump from complaining that 
European Union’s position on trade is “worse than China” and that EU 
treats the US “horribly”.42 He called the EU “foe”, although he noted 
“that doesn’t mean they are bad… it means that they are competitive”.43 
Tensions between the European Union and United States has escalated in 
2018. US imposed tariffs of 10% on aluminum and 25% on steel imported 
from Europe. The basis for that were alleged national security concerns. 
European Union has retaliated. After World Economic Forum which took 
place in January, 2020 Trump has announced that negotiations on new 
trade deal with European Union will be hold before November election. 
Even if it can be seen as positive momentum for trade talks, the chances 
that negotiations will be politicized for campaign purposes are high, 
especially that President Trump’s comments refl ect his core belief, that 
the United States are exploited by its partners.
41  European External Action Service, Anti-personnel mines: Statement by the Spokes-
person on the United States’ decision to re-introduce their use, Statement by the Spokes-
person, Brussels, 4.02.2020.
42  The Irish Times, Trump: ‘The European Union is worse than China’, 16.08.2019, 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/us/trump-the-european-union-is-worse-than-chi-
na-1.3988164 (access 22.04.2020).
43  Face the Nation, “I think the European Union is a foe,” Trump says ahead of Pu-
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Another bone of contention is a digital tax. Washington angrily 
responded to France’s new tax imposed on large technology companies 
which include American Amazon, Apple, Google and Facebook, 
threatening to retaliate with high tariffs on exports, including luxury 
goods and wine.44 Although French government has explained that drive 
behind it is to make companies with global revenues above 750 million 
euro to pay “fairer” taxes, Washington believes it is unfairly aimed at 
American business. European Commission reacted quickly by ensuring 
that EU will “act and react as one, and will remain united”.45
Donald Trump exploited public fear over Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). Agreement was another “victim” of 
Trump’s aversion to trade deals. On his fi rst day in offi ce, President 
abandon the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership. It is quite paradoxical that president 
igniting trade war with China pulls the country out from deal which could 
strengthenUnited States’ leverage in the region and give Beijing more 
incentives for changing its behavior.46 The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which was called by the president “the worst trade 
deal ever made”, was renegotiated. As an outcome, the United States Mexico 
Canada Agreement (USMCA) was signed. There are also background 
tensions regarding American blockage of new appointments to the Appellate 
Body in the World Trade Organization, effecting in paralysis of the second 
appeals step of the dispute settlement system. It was United States than in 
the past strongly advocate for creation of appellate body. Access to it was 
considered crucial for ensuring that countries could challenge decisions by 
ad hoc panels and for consistency when disputing over legal texts.47
“Global Europe” with “Strategic Autonomy”?
The increasingly global nature of threats like environmental pollution, 
security of energy supply, pandemics or networks of terrorism demand 





45  J. Valero, We will ‘react as one’, EU tells US over French digital tax dispute, “The 
Euractiv”, 3.12.2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/we-will-react-as-
one-eu-tells-us-over-french-digital-tax-dispute/ (access 22.04.2020).
46  E. Alden, Trump and the TPP: Giving Away Something for Nothing, Council on 
Foreign Relations, 23.01.2017.
47  J.A. Hillman, A Reset of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, Council 
on Foreign Relations, 14.01.2020.
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states and international organizations to work together. While global 
problems cannot be solved European Union or United States alone, 
their robust cooperation can create stewardship and bring other states 
to address regional and global problems. Weak cooperation will leave 
vacuum and allow other parties to fi ll the void. But with Donald Trump 
at helm, Europeans are starting to realize that American democracy is no 
longer producing consensual politics with predictable foreign policy and 
that the change of president, can also mean a new regime.48
In February 2019, during Munich Security Conference, Joe Biden 
assured politicians and security experts that Americans “will be back”, 
adding that “American people understand that it’s only by working in 
cooperation with our friends that we are going to be able to harness the 
forces of a rapidly changing world, to mitigate their downsides and turn 
them to our collective advantage”.49 But assumption that Democratic 
candidate will win November elections bear too much risk. Especially, 
that damage done to transatlantic relations by Trump’s presidency might 
be irreparable. 
The decay of transatlantic relations has not started with Donald Trump, 
nor it will end with his presidency. One of the reasons behind the rifts 
can be the power asymmetry between United States and Europe, which 
for a long time has been not only accepted, but also cultivated. As Alina 
Polyakowa and Benjamin Haddad put it “Europe remained submissive 
in exchange for a spot underneath the U.S. defense umbrella”.50 What is 
crucial is the fact that membership in the European Union and NATO 
overlaps. Currently twenty one states belong to both organizations. 
Tensions between transatlantic partners have arisen not only over EU 
plans to strength its capabilities, but also on strategies to solve dispute 
in the Western Balkans.One of the main challenges imposed by Trump’s 
administration is mismatch between president’s actions and that of the 
foreign policy professionals in current administration. At 2020 Munich 
Security Conference, Michael Pompeo said, “the death of the transatlantic 
alliance is grossly over-exaggerated”.51 It was the same State Secretary that 
in December 2018 delivered speech on “Restoring the Role of the Nation 
48  I. Krastev, Will Europe Ever Trust America Again?, “The New York Times”, 
3.12.2019.
49  ProductiehuisEU, #MSC2019: Joe Biden tells Europeans that America is ‘an em-
barrassment’ (Munich Security Conference), 16.02.2019, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Ab470h3X8I8 (access 22.04.2020).
50  A. Polyakova, B. Haddad, Europe Alone. What Comes After the Transatlantic Alli-
ance, “Foreign Affairs”, no. 98(4), July/August 2019, pp. 109–110.
51  M.R. Pompeo, The West Is Winning, Speech, Munich, 15.02.2020.
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State in the Liberal International Order” in which he named failings of 
international institutions. Not only the list included European Union, 
but also a call to Europeans urging them to “reassert their sovereignty”, 
which clearly echoed Donald Trump’s sentiments.52
Cracks in transatlantic relations (and Brexit) brought member states 
to work closer on security and defense. An urgent need for “strategic 
autonomy” is refl ected in “Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy” 
published in June 2016. In her foreword, Federica Mogherini underlined 
that priorities like common interest of European citizens, principles and 
values are “best served in an international rules and on multilateralism”.53 
Also, Ursula von der Leyen underlined in political guidelines for European 
Commission that more needs to be done toward “genuine” European 
Defence Union.54
Voices calling for “strategic autonomy” can be also heard from 
national capitals. In his Sorbonne speech delivered in September 2017, 
Emanuel Macron stated that in the area of defence, Europe needs to 
gain “autonomous operating capabilities”.55 In 2016 European leaders 
have agreed on plan to deepen security and defence. European Defence 
Fund have been launched. Apart from contributing to Europe’s strategic 
autonomy, the Fund coordinates member states investments in defence 
technology and catalyze for an innovative technology and equipment 
solutions.Twenty fi ve member states have jointly developed Permanent 
Structured Cooperation – permanent framework for closer cooperation 
and a process for deepening defence cooperation within EU framework. 
The measure can evolve under pressure from “serious and acute hybrid 
threats” which are a part of a reality.56
Conclusions
Times have changed. The world is constantly shifting, from bipolarity 
during Cold War through unipolar moment (aka Pax Americana or “end 
of history” moment) to times which can be described as „polynodal”,57 
52  M.R. Pompeo, Remarks by Secretary Pompeo on Restoring the Role of the Nation-
-State in the Liberal International Order, Speech, Brussels, 4.12.2018.
53  Shared Vision, op. cit.
54  U. von der Leyen, op.cit.
55  E. Macron, Sorbonne speech, Paris, 26.09.2017.
56  U. von der Leyen, op. cit.
57  European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, Global Trends to 2030. Challenges 
and Choices for Europe, April 2019.
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post-bipolar order or “multipolar disorder”.58 To put it simply “the jungle 
grows back”.59 According to Richard Gowan from International Crisis 
Group, Europe has to become a practical champion of multilateralism. 
Especially that in regard to global governance, Americans have had 
tendency to be more skeptical about multilateral institutions and 
mechanisms that Europeans. For EU current situation might be an 
opportunity to become a third pole in geopolitics (along with China and 
the U.S.).60 But for this to happen, European Unionhas to create political, 
economic and military capacity to address growing challenges from 
different parts of the world. As Josep Borrell said, Europe needs to learn 
“to use the language of power”.61 In other words, Europe must “develop 
appetite for power”.62 New era of great power competition has arrived.
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